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GAME OVER: A PROPOSAL TO REFORM
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 609
Edward Roslak
I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

Federal Rule of Evidence 609 creates a dilemma for criminal de1
fendants who have previously been convicted of other crimes.
Should the defendant choose to take the stand and testify, Rule 609
subjects him to the strong possibility of impeachment with evidence
of his previous convictions, ostensibly to taint the jury’s evaluation of
2
the defendant’s testimonial credibility. Rule 609 thus creates a zerosum game in which a criminal defendant must weigh his choice of
whether to testify and tell his story against the likelihood that he may
be impeached with evidence of his prior convictions. Knowledge of a
defendant’s prior convictions exposes the jury to three distinct temptations to convict the defendant for a reason other than the jury’s belief beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
charged offense. First, a juror armed with knowledge of a defendant’s prior crimes could be tempted to punish the defendant again
3
for his prior offenses and not for the charged crime. Second, a juror
∗
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1
Specifically, the Rule provides that
[f]or the purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness of a witness, (1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the
law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and (2) evidence that any
witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted regardless of
the punishment, if it readily can be determined that establishing the
elements of the crime required proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness.
FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
2
See, e.g., Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
3
See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 357 (1795).
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may also be tempted by the knowledge of the defendant’s prior convictions to convict the defendant simply because of the view that he is
4
a “bad man” and should be removed from society. Third, a juror
may use the prior conviction information to infer that the defendant
possesses a propensity to commit a crime—an inference specifically
5
prohibited by Rule 404. A criminal defendant who would otherwise
testify may instead choose not to take the stand specifically to prevent
the jury from being exposed to evidence of his prior crimes. Thus,
the potential for impeachment can result in fewer criminal defendants taking the stand with the concomitant loss of their ability to tell
the jury their story in their own words.
Although defendants impeached under Rule 609 are normally
6
entitled to the issuance of a limiting instruction to the jury, empirical studies have called into question the actual value of these limiting
7
jury instructions. Knowledge of prior convictions invites jurors to
8
make inferences beyond the scope of those permitted by Rule 609,
9
and this invitation is likely too often accepted. Practitioners have
come to note that “if you throw a skunk into the jury box, you can’t
10
instruct the jury not to smell it.” Defendants have also taken notice—defendants with records of prior convictions do not testify as of11
ten as defendants without them. By remaining off the stand, defendants substantially increase the probability that a jury will not hear of
4

See, e.g., Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70
YALE L.J. 763, 763 (1961).
5
FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”).
6
When evidence of prior convictions is admitted for impeachment purposes
under Rule 609, the defendant may request, and usually receives, an instruction to
the jury limiting the use of the information for credibility purposes only. 1 EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 1.03 (rev. ed. 1998).
7
Empirical research has called into question the jury’s ability to substantively
follow limiting instructions and illuminates the likely misuse of prior misconduct evidence for purposes other than credibility. Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On
the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on
Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 42 (1985).
8
FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (allowing impeachment solely for the “purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness of a witness”).
9
Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, at 44.
10
See, e.g., Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1962).
11
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 146–47 (Little, Brown
and Co., spec. ed. 1993) (1966). Defendants who do not have a criminal record elect
not to testify in only nine percent of cases examined. Id. at 146. When the defendant does have a record, twenty-six percent elect not to testify. Id. When the case for
acquittal is strong, defendants without records elect to testify ninety percent of the
time, compared with fifty-three percent for defendants with criminal records. Id.
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12

their prior criminal record. However, in criminal cases, the defendant tends to be one of the best sources of available information, thus
compounding the moral conundrum Rule 609 imposes upon our sys13
tem.
The American adversarial system depends on the parties to pro14
duce information. Thus, both parties view potential proffers of evidence through the prism of partisan self-interest. Absent necessity, a
defendant’s belief that the fact-finder will utilize information in a
manner not conducive to his self-interest could influence his decision
15
to proffer the information. This partisan behavior directly impacts
16
the information given to the ultimate fact-finder. When a criminal
defendant with prior impeachable convictions decides to remain silent due to fear of impeachment, Rule 609 in effect deprives the jury
of hearing the defendant’s story and thus directly leads to a decline
of useful, admissible information about the event in controversy.
There must be a reconciliation between the system’s desire for the
17
defendant’s testimony and the reality that should the defendant
provide such testimony, impeachment will likely follow shortly there18
after.
Our historic acknowledgement that criminal defendants should
19
20
be able to testify, the actual epistemic value of such testimony, and
21
Rule 609’s effect on defendants—their likelihood to choose silence —indicate that the Rule should be reformed. This Comment explores the strategies available to the adversarial parties through the

12

Id. at 146–47. A jury does not hear of a defendant’s prior record eighty-seven
percent of the time when the defendant elects not to testify. Id. at 147. Should the
defendant take the stand, the percentage falls to twenty-eight percent. Id.
13
Alan D. Hornstein, Between Rock and a Hard Place: The Right to Testify and Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1, 19 (1997).
14
In contrast, the inquisitorial model used on the European continent concentrates the information gathering process in the hands of the investigating magistrate.
See MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 77 (1997).
15
John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—
Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 3 J. EMPIRICAL STUD. 477, 490–92 (2008).
16
See infra Part III.
17
See infra Part II.
18
See, e.g., Hornstein, supra note 13, at 17–18. Although Rule 609 provides that
the impeachment evidence be subjected to a balancing test before being admitted,
admissibility tends to be the norm. See id. at 20. But see United States v. Footman, 33
F. Supp. 2d 60, 61–63 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that defendant’s prior rape conviction was inadmissible for impeachment purposes).
19
See infra Part II.
20
See infra Part II.
21
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 11, at 146–47.
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22

lens of the zero-sum paradigm of game theory and proposes that
evidence of prior convictions be made inadmissible for the purposes
23
of impeaching a criminal defendant’s credibility. Part II charts the
historical growth of a criminal defendant’s right to testify and introduces the dilemma faced by criminal defendants with prior convictions. Part III further explores this dilemma with a focus on Rule
609. Part IV utilizes game theory to model the defendant’s dilemma
of whether to testify under Rule 609. Part V proposes to eliminate
the dilemma by amending the Rule to disallow prior crimes impeachment against criminal defendants.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE GAME
Evidentiary rules that governed what import the jury should
grant to the impeachment of a defendant’s testimony did not exist at
early common law because criminal defendants had no right to testify
24
at all. The standard English punishment for the commission of a
25
Due to the prevalence of capital punishment,
felony was death.
criminal defendants were deemed to have a strong incentive to lie
26
under oath. This doctrine of interest held that “interested persons”
27
were incompetent to testify. As all parties to an action were “inter28
ested,” the doctrine by definition prevented the testimony of crimi29
nal defendants. To compensate for the defendants’ incompetence
22

See, e.g., WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA: JOHN VON NEUMANN, GAME
THEORY, AND THE PUZZLE OF THE BOMB 51–55 (1992).
23
See infra Part V.
24
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 65 (West Publ’g
Co. 1954).
25
See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *9.
26
See 1 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 350–55
(London, MacMillan 1883); see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *370.
27
MCCORMICK, supra note 24, § 65.
28
This included parties to civil actions. See, e.g., State v. Barrows, 76 Me. 401, 409
(1884).
29
At early common law, trials could be resolved through compurgation. JAMES
BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 24–26
(1898). Parties obtaining groups of “oath-swearers” would have these “witnesses”
swear to the veracity of the party’s sworn oath. Id. at 25. Thus, for example, in an
action in debt
the party who had to prove his case was to bring in ten men; five were
set on one side and five on the other, and a knife was tossed up in the
space between them. The five towards whom the handle lay were then
set aside; from the other five one was removed, and the remaining four
took on the oath as compurgators.
Id. at 26. Whether a party could obtain the requisite number of people as compurgators was the deciding factor. See id. at 27–28. The Norman Conquest brought with it
the attempt of the Crown to consolidate its power; trial by compurgation was forbid-
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to testify under oath, they were granted the right to make an unsworn
30
The American colonies also practiced
statement before the jury.
31
this English doctrine, and it remained in place following the Revo32
lution.
Although ostensibly designed to benefit the defendant, the unsworn statement had to be delivered without the aid of counsel and
33
thus tended to be of little and uncertain value to the jury. It was
uncommon for defendants, who had little understanding of the legal
issues that confronted them, to give unsworn statements that would
34
aid their legal case. Moreover, while the defendant could deliver
the statement without fear of cross-examination, in some jurisdictions
the prosecutor could present evidence in rebuttal, even otherwise
35
impermissible evidence. Thus, the practical operation of the unsworn statement doctrine significantly impaired the defendant’s ability to tell his story to the fact-finder.
By the early nineteenth century, the doctrine of interest came
36
under attack, with reformers arguing that it prevented too much in-

den in the Assize of Clarendon in 1166. Id. at 26. The introduction of jury trial before the King’s judge was offered as an alternative to a trial by battle. See id. at 26.
The Crown’s justice system placed limits on the defendant’s trial options: “In treason
and felony the accused could not have counsel; later, when witnesses could be had
for the king, the accused could not have them; and still later, when he also could
have them, his witnesses could not be sworn.” Id. at 157. By the founding of America, “all witnesses that have the use of their reason, [were] to be received and examined, except such as are infamous, or such as are interested in the event of the
cause.” 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *370. “Infamy” referred to non-party witnesses who had prior convictions for treason, crimen falsi, or any felony.
MCCORMICK, supra note 24, § 64. “Interest” referred to the interest the parties themselves had in the outcome. Id. § 65.
30
See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 9 Mich. 314 (1861). A criminal defendant’s “right”
to make an un-sworn statement before the fact-finder probably originated from the
sixteenth-century necessity of having the defendant conduct his own defense. See
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573 (1961).
31
See The King v. Lukens, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 5 (1762) (in which defendant moved to
have himself sworn, but court denied motion because matter “must be proved by indifferent Witnesses”).
32
See Note, The Adoption of the Common Law, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 499, 499–500
(1916).
33
Unsworn statement testimony would be taken for any value the jury wished to
grant such a statement and in some jurisdictions was not even considered evidence.
See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 589.
34
See id. at 592–93.
35
See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 48 S.E.2d 865, 866–71 (Ga. 1948).
36
Bentham led the way by advocating the abolition of all exclusionary rules of
evidence and allowing a system of “free-proof” to stand in its stead. WILLIAM
TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 3 (1985).
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formation from being put before the fact-finder.
In the United
States, the abrogation of the rules of interest for parties in civil trials
38
came first, but, by the mid-nineteenth century, states also began to
39
grant competency to criminal defendants. After witnessing these reforms in the United States, English commentator Sir James Stephen
stated that he was
convinced by much experience that questioning, or the power of
giving evidence, is a positive assistance, and a highly important
one, to innocent men, and I do not see why in the case of the
guilty there need be any hardship about it. . . .
....
. . . A poor and ill-advised man . . . is always liable to misapprehend the true nature of his defense, and might in many cases be
saved from the consequences of his own ignorance or misfortune
40
by being questioned as a witness.

The results impressed Stephen to such an extent that he
changed his own position regarding the grant of competency to criminal defendants in the late nineteenth century after years of advocat41
These British observations of the trend to grant
ing otherwise.
42
competency in America led Britain to do the same.
By the mid-twentieth century, Georgia was the last common law
43
jurisdiction on earth to deny competency to criminal defendants.
The characteristics of the unsworn statement finally elicited action
37

The erosion took place first in England, followed by other common law jurisdictions, including the United States. James Bradley Thayer, A Chapter of Legal History
in Massachusetts, 9 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10–12 (1895).
38
Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 576 n.5.
39
Individual states granted competency to criminal defendants to testify in the
following years: Alabama, 1885; Alaska, 1899; Arizona, 1871; Arkansas, 1885; California, 1866; Colorado, 1872; Connecticut, 1867; Delaware, 1893; Florida, 1895; Hawaii,
1876; Idaho, 1875; Illinois, 1874; Indiana, 1873; Iowa, 1878; Kansas, 1871; Kentucky,
1886; Louisiana, 1886; Maine, 1864; Maryland, 1876; Massachusetts, 1866; Michigan,
1881; Minnesota, 1868; Mississippi, 1882; Missouri, 1877; Montana, 1872; Nebraska,
1873; Nevada, 1867; New Hampshire, 1869; New Jersey, 1871; New Mexico, 1880;
New York, 1869; North Carolina, 1881; North Dakota, 1879; Ohio, 1867; Oklahoma,
1890; Oregon, 1880; Pennsylvania, 1885; Rhode Island, 1871; South Carolina, 1866;
South Dakota, 1879; Tennessee, 1887; Texas, 1889; Utah, 1878; Vermont, 1866; Virginia, 1886; Washington, 1871; West Virginia, 1881; Wisconsin, 1869; and Wyoming,
1877. Id. at 577 n.6. In 1961, the Supreme Court of the United States mandated that
Georgia also extend competency to criminal defendants. Id. at 596.
40
STEPHEN, supra note 26, at 442–44.
41
Prior to the grant of competency, Stephen had argued that a criminal defendant should not be extended competency to testify due to the pressure of being untruthful on the stand. JAMES F. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 185–88, 199–202 (Fred B. Rothman & Co., 2d ed. 1985) (1890).
42
See Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36, §§ 1–7 (Eng.).
43
Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 570.
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from the United States Supreme Court, which examined it beneath
44
the umbrella of the more general right to counsel. The Supreme
Court relied on the right to counsel to find that jurisdictions in the
United States must allow defendants to have their statements elicited
45
through the questioning of their lawyers. For example, in Ferguson
46
v. Georgia, the defense counsel attempted to call the defendant, Fer47
guson, to testify at trial, only to be rebuffed by the trial judge. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, Ferguson successfully argued that a
failure to allow him to testify deprived him of the right to have his
counsel elicit his statement from him, rather than delivering a state48
ment alone, without the aid of counsel.
The grant of competency to criminal defendants tended to be
accompanied by the restriction and eventual abolition of the unsworn
49
statement doctrine itself. Despite the obvious benefits, however, the
demise of the unsworn statement doctrine also led to the dilemma
faced by those with prior convictions. In all American jurisdictions,
from Ferguson onward, the defendant’s choice would be either to testify under oath or to remain silent. In either case, a defendant would
suffer the consequences of any unintended inferences that the jury
might thereby establish. The Supreme Court attempted to mitigate
the potential harm caused by a defendant’s choice to remain silent by
holding that, should a defendant choose silence, no comment by the
50
court could work to create an inference of guilt. The Court further
44

Id. at 594–95.
Id. at 596.
46
365 U.S. 570 (1961).
47
Id. at 571.
48
Id. at 596. Notably, the defendant argued for an extension of the Fourteenth
Amendment not to cover the right to testify, but rather to have a right to counsel. Id.
at 601 (Clark, J., concurring). In concurrence, Justice Clark noted that by accepting
the defendant’s argument, the Court left open the possibility of the defendant making an unsworn statement with the aid of counsel without being cross-examined. Id.
at 602.
49
Id. at 583–84, 587.
50
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). Interestingly, the Court cited to
the opinion in People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753 (Cal. 1965), which indicated that an
inference of guilt may not be the only inference made by the jury should the defendant choose to stay silent. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614–15. According to the Court, the
jury could also infer that the defendant chose to stay silent due to the pressure of
prior conviction impeachment. Id. The Modesto court justified its ruling in part on
the idea that there was no way to instruct the jury to disregard the prejudicial effect
of a defendant’s refusal to testify. Modesto, 398 P.2d at 761. The Court’s reasoning in
Griffin later found its way into the Federal Rules of Evidence, which states, for example, that “[u]pon request, any party against whom the jury might draw an adverse inference from a claim of privilege is entitled to an instruction that no inference may
be drawn therefrom.” FED. R. EVID. 513.
45
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reinforced the goal of having the defendant testify by removing other
51
common law barriers and extending the right to a defendant whose
52
In
testimony included recollections achieved through hypnosis.
both instances, the Court referred to its decisions as a matter of fair53
ness to the defendant, and as a method of improving the epistemo54
logical value of the trial process.
The historical progression of the defendant’s ability to testify
under oath illuminates several crucial aspects of the problem of Rule
609 and impeachment. There is an ever increasing desire to allow a
defendant’s testimony into the trial arena. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has come to accept that the defendant’s story is one of the
55
most crucial pieces of information available to the fact-finder, and a
need to provide a fair proceeding would seem to outweigh any lingering concerns about the nature of the oath itself. However, by enshrining the defendant’s constitutional ability to testify under oath
56
with aid of counsel, the Supreme Court only reinforced the dilemma presented to defendants with prior convictions. The choice of
whether to testify may be created and reinforced as a constitutionally

51

Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612–13 (1972) (holding that the commonlaw restriction which forced the defendant to choose whether or not to testify before
calling any other witnesses violated the right to counsel). The Court found that the
restriction placed a “heavy burden on a defendant’s otherwise unconditional right to
take the stand . . . . The rule, in other words, cuts down on the privilege (to remain
silent) by making its assertion costly.” Id. at 610–11 (footnote omitted).
52
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 54–62 (1987).
53
Id. at 51; see Brooks, 406 U.S. at 612–13; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 819 n.15 (1975) (calling the right of the accused to testify one of the rights that
“are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process”); In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 273 (1948) (“A person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and
an opportunity to be heard in his defense—a right to his day in court—are basic in
our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.”).
54
Rock, 483 U.S. at 49–50; see Brooks, 406 U.S. at 609.
55
See Rock, 483 U.S. at 52.
56
Brooks, 406 U.S. at 611–12. The Supreme Court was well aware of the dilemma
faced by defendants.
Pressuring the defendant to take the stand, by foreclosing later testimony if he refuses, is not a constitutionally permissible means of ensuring his honesty. It fails to take into account the very real and legitimate
concerns that might motivate a defendant to exercise his right of silence. And it may compel even a wholly truthful defendant, who might
otherwise decline to testify for legitimate reasons, to subject himself to
impeachment and cross-examination at a time when the strength of his
other evidence is not yet clear.
Id.
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protected trial tactic in our adversarial system. However, the overall
value of each tactical choice—to testify or to remain silent—is questionable. Both of these choices provide admittedly negative conse58
Thus, while the Supreme Court exquences to the defendant.
tended and protected criminal defendants’ right to testify, it did not
resolve the tactical dilemma this right poses defendants with prior
convictions.
59
Congress recognized the dilemma, at least in part. By passing
Federal Rule 609, Congress sought to alleviate the burden placed
upon defendants with prior convictions by imposing a balancing
60
test. The current adoption of Federal Rule 609 is the result of a
congressional compromise between the House, which promulgated a
61
draft limiting the Rule’s application only to crimen falsi, and the
Senate, which supported a version that expanded the use of the rule
57

See Rock, 483 U.S. at 52–55 (noting the criminal defendant’s constitutional
right to testify in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments); see also Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 594 (1961) (establishing criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to testify).
58
According to Justice Holmes, for example,
[W]hen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime, the
only ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is the general readiness to do evil which the conviction may be supposed to show.
It is from that general disposition alone that the jury is asked to infer a
readiness to lie in the particular case, and thence that he has lied in
fact. The evidence has no tendency to prove that he was mistaken, but
only that he has perjured himself, and it reaches that conclusion solely
through the general proposition that he is of bad character and unworthy of credit.
Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
59
Federal Rule 609 specifically developed as a committee compromise: the
House draft of the Rule sought to limit impeachment only to crimen falsi while the
Senate draft would always admit such information. Edward E. Gainor, Note, Character Evidence by Any Other Name . . . : A Proposal to Limit Impeachment by Prior Conviction
Under Rule 609, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 762, 773–74 (1990). In reaching a compromise, Congress incorporated a balancing test and allowed impeachment for prior
crimes involving felony subject to the judicial application of the test. Id. at 775. The
House Judiciary Committee draft of Rule 609 limited the use of impeachment only to
crimes involving “dishonesty or false statement.” H.R. REP. No. 650, at 11 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. (88 Stat. 1926) 7075, 7093. The Senate version of the
draft would have allowed impeachment for any prior felony. 120 CONG. REC. 37,076
(1974).
60
Rule 609(a) states that “evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a
crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.” FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
61
The term “crimen falsi” refers to “crimes of falsehood,” such as perjury. See
FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (allowing for all prior conviction evidence to be admitted
“regardless of the punishment, if it readily can be determined that establishing the
elements of the crime required proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false
statement by the witness”).
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62

to any felony. The compromise resulted in the adoption of a bal63
ancing test: felonies may be used for impeachment purposes if “the
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence
64
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.” Substantively then,
65
Rule 609 allows the prosecutor to use evidence of prior convictions
to impeach a criminal defendant who chooses to testify, subject to the
66
balancing test and the limitations of Rule 403.
Congress granted no guidance as to how to determine whether
the probative value of a given piece of information outweighs its prejudicial effect; judges are instead left to apply the Rule individually,
67
with all the variation judicial determinations entail. In general, trial
68
judges applying this balancing test tend to find that the probative
value of the prior conviction outweighs the prejudice that admitting
69
the information imposes upon the defendant. Even in cases where
the defendant’s prior conviction was for a similar crime—thus com62

See Gainor, supra note 59, at 770–76 (offering detailed overview of history leading up to congressional compromise).
63
The balancing test is similar to that developed by the court in Luck v. United
States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
64
FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
65
The conviction must be for a crime the penalty of which is either death or imprisonment for greater than one year. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
66
FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”).
67
See Roderick Surrat, Prior-Conviction Impeachment Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach to Applying the “Balancing” Provision of Rule 609(a), 31
SYRACUSE L. REV. 907, 929 (1980).
68
The position in which the balancing test places the judge demonstrates the
American Adversary system’s trust in legal education and experience to provide the
proper mental tools for differentiating bits and pieces of evidence, weighing them
only according to the probative standard, and thereby producing a decision. See
DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 30. In order to rule on a defendant’s motion in limine to
exclude prejudicial impeachment information, the judge must first be told the prejudicial information and then—without it having a prejudicial effect on the judge—
rule on the information’s admissibility. Id. at 50. Given the judge’s position as a “repeat player” in the trial process, whether it is possible for the judge to provide the
atomistic thought process necessary to make the required determination seems unlikely. See id. at 30; A. Leo Levin & Harold K. Cohen, The Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury
Criminal Cases, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 905, 907 (1971); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie
& Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1259 (2005); Note, Improper Evidence in
Jury Trials: Basis for Reversal?, 79 HARV. L. REV. 407, 409 (1965).
69
Gainor, supra note 59, at 780 (noting that “the federal circuits give such great
weight to the probative value of prior felony convictions that appellate panels are
likely to uphold nearly any trial court decision to admit a prior felony conviction for
impeachment—no matter how great the prejudice to the defendant”).
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pounding the prejudicial value of a conviction with the temptation to
70
use the information for the forbidden propensity inference —courts
71
have been willing to allow the information into the trial arena. To
compensate for this admissibility of potentially prejudicial information, the defendant may request a charge to the jurors limiting their
72
consideration of this evidence to credibility only. However, the remedy may not be as reliable as envisioned—the actual effectiveness of
73
the jury instructions is doubtful.
Ironically, the defendant with prior convictions is still penalized
for having an “interest” in the outcome of the case. Whereas previ74
ously the defendant was forced into silence, now the penalty is a
75
choice between risks, with the possibility of a dangerous jury infer76
77
ence attached to either option. Since this choice is “voluntary,”
78
provided that there is adequate assistance of counsel, our adversarial system regards the defendant’s choice in this matter as the appropriate framework for producing epistemically correct trial out79
comes.
III. THE CONTOURS OF THE GAME: APPLICATION OF RULE 609
Although proponents of our criminal trial process generally de80
fend the system’s existence as a means of producing truthful out81
82
comes, other systemic concerns alter the equation. Our system relies on two competing parties to bring information into the trial for

70

See id.
See Blume, supra note 15, at 483–86; see also Gainor, supra note 59, at 780.
72
FED. R. EVID. 105 (“When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for
one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”).
73
See Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, at 43.
74
See, e.g., State v. Barrows, 76 Me. 401, 409 (1884).
75
See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
76
Id. (noting that the jury may infer the criminal defendant’s guilt by his refusal
to testify, or by the fact that he was convicted of prior crimes).
77
See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972).
78
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (1961).
79
DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 74.
80
“Truthful,” especially in the criminal context, must mean the conviction of the
guilty and the acquittal of the innocent.
81
DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 123.
82
FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained
and proceedings justly determined.”).
71
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83

evaluation by a judge and, due to this reliance, epistemic concerns
often give way to questions of equity. Both parties must feel that the
84
Public confidence in the judiciary system relies
process was fair.
upon the parties’ perception that the judiciary is “committed to ob85
serving notions of fairness, justice, and equality before the law.”
While the medieval trial by battle has been safely relegated to
the halls of memory, the specter of two armed combatants sparring
86
still lends itself as an analogy to our current trial process. This conflict between the parties, combined with the need for judges to play
the role of neutral arbiter, leads to the development of exclusionary
87
rules of evidence, such as Rule 609. Examined in this light, the exclusionary rules exist in part to provide acceptable contours to the
88
game being played by the parties. The exclusionary rules, along
with privileges and rights, form the sword and shield of one party, the
net and trident of the other.
If an adversarial criminal trial can be viewed as a game played
between two parties, what are the stakes? For the defendant, the
avoidance of punishment provides a powerful incentive for making
tactical choices which can enhance or dampen the “truth seeking”
aspect of the trial. For example, the jury might expect an innocent
defendant to testify. After all, if a criminal defendant maintains his
innocence to the crime charged, what would there be to fear from
83

DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 122.
Id.
85
Bothwell v. Republic Tobacco Co., 912 F. Supp. 1221, 1235 (D. Neb. 1995).
86
Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State’s Right to a Fair Trial, 60
S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1037 (1987).
The classic view of the trial is that it is a “search for truth.” In this view,
the adversary system is a contest between equals. The role of the prosecutor is to obtain a conviction, while the role of the defense attorney
is to obtain an acquittal. If each carries out his role, then the truth will
emerge. The goal of this model is to arrive at an accurate result. The
search for truth model demands that the “scales must be eveuly [sic]
held,” so that the parties may be equally armed for adversarial combat.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn
Old Chief, and “Legitimate Moral Force”: Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and
Gore, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 436–38 (1998).
87
See DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 84.
88
The Supreme Court has pointed out from time to time that criminal trials are
not games. See, e.g., Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 150 (1990). However, it is difficult to otherwise conceive of a system in which two adversaries employ “tactics,” or
strategies, in order to counter or thwart each other’s actions and achieve goals that
are at cross-purposes with each other. See Risinger, supra note 86, at 436–38. The use
of these tactics can affect the probative weight that the jury attaches to information
exposed because of a tactical decision or to prejudicial evidence revealed by one. See
Risinger, supra note 86, at 438.
84
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the addition of his side of the story? By testifying, the defendant increases the pool of information available to the jury—information
that the jury might require in order to make a finding of innocence.
On the other hand, the factually guilty defendant can either risk the
process of testifying and endure the cross-examination or choose to
90
seek refuge behind a constitutional shield and remain silent. Moreover, a factually guilty defendant who chooses silence likely does not
add incorrect testimonial information for the jury to consider because he is not adding any testimonial evidence at all. In either
event, the defendant’s ability to choose whether to testify aids the
court’s determination of guilt or innocence.
For the prosecutor, the incentive is to see justice done by seeking the conviction of the guilty. A prosecutor who files frivolous
91
charges against a defendant violates his ethical duty. Thus, in order
to determine whether to bring criminal charges against a defendant,
the prosecutor must first form a belief that the individual is guilty of
the crime charged. Therefore, it is unlikely that a prosecutor would
file criminal charges against a defendant in the first instance if the
prosecutor was not already convinced that the defendant was likely
guilty of the crime charged. From a perspective of omniscience, ethical prosecutors would bring charges against only factually guilty defendants. However, the common human constraint of finite knowledge ensures that, occasionally, prosecutors will make mistakes and
92
bring charges against factually innocent defendants.
Regardless,
once armed with a good faith belief that the defendant is guilty of the
charged crime, a prosecutor will attempt to see justice done—mostly
through obtaining convictions. Like the defense, the prosecution’s
role is not specifically to ensure an epistemically correct outcome
from an omniscient perspective (the trial process itself creates this
aura of rectitude), but rather to create the conditions through the
adversary system to ensure what the prosecutor regards as the correct
outcome.
From this perspective, cross-examination, the tool recognized for
its supposed epistemic value, can also be seen as a partisan weapon in
an adversarial battle. Impeachment of the defendant is one of the
strongest aspects of cross-examination. If the “truth-seeking” value of
cross-examination exposes a factually guilty defendant to conviction,
89

Plenty, according to the Supreme Court. See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S.
605, 607–13 (1972).
90
E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V.
91
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2001).
92
See, e.g., Blume, supra note 15, at 490.
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the system produces the correct outcome. However, once convinced
of the defendant’s guilt, to the eyes of the prosecutor, “the truth” will
always be a guilty verdict. In the case of a factually innocent defendant, negative inferences the fact-finder may make that arise from
cross-examination do not help the fact-finder reach the correct outcome. In the case of an innocent defendant, the cross-examination is
more akin to a combatant’s weapon in the trial arena. In light of this
situation, systematic belief in the method of adversarial crossexamination as being the “greatest engine ever invented for the discovery of truth” should not be accepted without the qualification that
the method is “almost equally powerful for the creation of false im93
pressions.”
Thus, when presented with a choice of strategies, both sides have
a strong incentive to ensure not that the best kinds of information
enter the trial arena, but rather that whatever information or lack
thereof promotes the achievement of the party’s desired partisan
94
As previously noted, the defendant’s desire is to avoid
outcome.
punishment; the prosecution’s desire is to see punishment meted
out. Both sides will use all of the tools at their disposal to realize
these goals. The defendant will or will not testify based upon his subjective determination of the choice that benefits him more. If the defendant testifies, the prosecution will cross-examine. If the defendant
has prior convictions, the prosecution will seek to impeach the defendant’s credibility. Whether these decisions result in a trial procedure that concludes with a “truthful” outcome is not necessarily as relevant to the parties as achieving their own goals. Both guilty and
innocent defendants alike desire acquittal.
From the fact-finder’s perspective, only information which has
95
positive epistemic value should be taken into consideration and,
even then, considered only in regard to the methods that the system
96
deems acceptable. Juries tend to infer several things from the de93

1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 8 (Tillers rev. 1983) (1940).
Damaška links this incentive with the growth of exclusionary rules, in order to
“pressure the parties and their lawyers to make available the best or most reliable
sources of information to the court.” DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 84–85. But see Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 403, 465 (1992) (asserting that exclusionary rules are developed as “the result of
an active judiciary seeking to control the activities of law enforcement officials at the
expense of achieving a reliable result in the judicial proceeding”). However, if one
counts the police and the prosecutor as the same “party,” exclusionary rules which
developed through a desire to check the power of the police are also concerned with
“equity” between the parties themselves and not the function of “truth-seeking.”
95
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401.
96
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403.
94
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fendant’s choice of testimony or silence. First, although the prosecution cannot emphasize a negative inference from a defendant’s si98
lence as proof of guilt, the jury is capable of making negative infer99
ences on its own. Second, if the defendant chooses to testify, this
testimony lies beneath a mantle of overall juror distrust, even under
100
Impeachment with evidence of prior
the best of circumstances.
convictions should be a factor only in the juror’s evaluation of the epistemic value of the defendant’s testimony; the judicial system incor101
However, in
porates the belief that this is its ostensible purpose.
the context of prior crimes credibility impeachment, the dangers of
impeachment’s prejudicial usage are twofold: first, there exists a fear
102
that the fact-finder will be tempted to make a “bad person” propen103
sity inference; second, there is a fear that the jury will overestimate
104
its probative value.
The first concern speaks to the heart of whether an individual is
capable of performing the kind of analysis that the law mandates.
The law requires that jurors evaluate the information presented to
them in an atomistic way. In light of this mandate, the argument of
an individual juror’s capability to process impeachment information
has traditionally centered on whether one regards a human being’s
105
analytical powers as performing primarily in an atomistic or a holis97

See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); Wissler & Saks, supra note 7,
at 41–42.
98
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615.
99
Id. at 614 (“What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing.
What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence
against him is quite another”).
100
Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, at 41 (finding that “the credibility rating of the
defendant was significantly lower than that of the other witnesses in each case”).
101
FED. R. EVID. 601(a).
102
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 6, § 1.03.
103
FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”).
104
See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 6, § 1.03.
105
DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 33–36.
When jurors are told to use a piece of evidence for a narrow inferential
purpose, the successful completion of this task often calls for sophisticated mental operations. Preventing one’s inference from overflowing
into legally forbidden territory can even be a real psychological feat—if
it is psychologically possible at all. One of the most obvious examples is
the demand that a defendant’s criminal record be used only as it affects the credibility of his in-court testimony. To prevent the ripple effects of this information from producing a broader probative impact
on belief formation presupposes remarkable self-control and intellectual delicacy. Not much less sophistication is needed to consider an
item of information only for the purpose of determining whether it was
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106

tic manner. Both models provide a theory as to how human be107
ings’ cognitive capacity weighs information.
The atomistic models may be divided into probabilistic and non108
Under the probabilistic version, a human beprobabilistic models.
ing attaches probability values along a sliding scale to each individual
109
piece of information under consideration.
The non-probabilistic
version proposes that human beings weigh information using a bi110
Under this version, human beings either believe a
nary system.
111
piece of information or not. Both of the atomistic models suppose
that human beings have the capacity to consider individual pieces of
112
In contrast, the
information in isolation with broader themes.
school of holistic thought supposes that people are unable to consider pieces of information in isolation of broader concepts and instead use narratives and stories to determine whether a piece of in113
formation is valid.
The remedy for the inclusion of prejudicial
information into the trial arena in the Rule 609 context is a limiting
114
We count on these jury instructions, which
instruction to the jury.
suppose that the atomistic models represent juror decision making,
to ensure that the juror cognitive process proceeds according to the
115
This limiting instruction makes it
manner endorsed by the law.
plain that the prior conviction evidence the jury just heard should
not sully their thinking outside of the limited context of whether the
defendant was telling the truth under oath. Thus, Rule 609 presupposes that an individual can grasp information of prior convictions
and then apply this information in an atomistic manner if so directed
by a limiting instruction.
Whenever a single individual is responsible for hearing prejudicial information, evaluating it, and then “excluding” it from the decimade (rather than also for its truth) or to employ a piece of information only with regard to one of several joint charges arising from a single event.
Id. at 33. Damaška borrows the term “atomism” from William Twining. See id. at 35
n.20.
106
See id. at 35.
107
See id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 35.
112
Id.
113
Id.; see Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 522 (1991).
114
FED. R. EVID. 105.
115
See DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 33–36.
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sion-making process, as a judge must do in a bench trial, the system’s assumption that human cognitive function corresponds to the
117
atomistic model is on display. Legal training and the judge’s ex118
perience on the bench are both said to aid judges particularly in
applying exclusionary rules correctly and not drawing prejudicial
119
Although
“bad man” inferences from prior conviction evidence.
120
“presumptions of propriety” help insulate a judge’s evidentiary rul121
ings in a bench trial from searching appellate review, cases do occur in which a judge fails to live up to the atomistic ideal in a fashion
122
that is egregious enough to merit censure. If the judge, possessing
specialized training and experience, is not immune from misusing
propensity evidence, it stands to reason that the problem “is more
persuasively explained by human cognitive imperfections, tout
123
In other words, the misuse of propensity evidence is part of
court.”
a human being’s holistic cognitive functions and a weakness for
which Rule 609 does not adequately compensate. The propriety of
evidentiary rules such as Rule 609 comes into doubt when we acknowledge that some judges cannot perform the calculus required by
law and that introduction of the information to a lay juror will likely
124
invite a propensity inference. This criticism blends into the second
“fear”: that the probative value of a prior conviction may be exagger125
ated by the fact-finder.
Empirical studies have shown that juries who become aware of a
criminal defendant’s prior criminal convictions tend to use that information and convict the accused more often than when a defen126
One study,
dant’s prior criminal convictions are not presented.
conducted by Professors Roselle Wissler and Michael Saks, involved
116

Levin & Cohen, supra note 68, at 906.
Id. at 905.
118
DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 30.
119
Absent these traits, there would be little separating a judge from a lay-juror,
who is not trusted to perform the required calculus without instructions.
120
Levin & Cohen, supra note 68, at 907.
121
Id.
122
See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 271 A.2d 641, 644 (Md. 1970) (noting that
“judges, being flesh and blood, are subject to the same emotions and human frailties
as affect other members of the specie”); State v. Eugene, 536 N.W.2d 692, 696 (N.D.
1995); Commonwealth v. Oglesby, 263 A.2d 419, 420 (Pa. 1970) (noting that trial
judge’s finding in bench trial for guilt depended solely upon defendant’s prior criminal record).
123
DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 32.
124
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155
U. PA. L. REV. 165, 185–88 (2006).
125
IMWINKELRIED, supra note 6, § 1.03.
126
Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, at 39–43.
117
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presenting hypothetical fact patterns to individuals. The study utilized two different fact patterns, one in which the crime charged in128
The study’s particivolved auto theft, the other involving murder.
pants agreed to read the materials and reach a verdict as if they were
129
jurors.
Each story was designed to have the defendant testify and
130
leave the question of his guilt ambiguous. In the study, the fact pattern was presented in one of four conditions: (1) non-use of the prior
record information, (2) previous conviction for the charged crime,
(3) previous conviction for a different crime, or (4) previous convic131
tion for perjury.
In all instances where the fact pattern introduced
information of the prior convictions, the individuals were given a limiting instruction that the information was to be used only for assess132
ment of the witnesses’ credibility. Wissler and Saks theorized that if
the prior conviction evidence was used correctly, the result would be
most easily seen under the condition that provided for a prior convic133
tion for perjury.
Surprisingly, the results of the study indicated that credibility for
134
the defendants in each condition was uniformly low.
From a commonsense point of view, one would expect a juror to be skeptical of
any defendant’s testimony, given the pressures placed upon that person to have his story conform to his protestations of innocence.
However, if jurors are not evaluating prior crimes evidence to assess
credibility, what are they doing with it? While credibility did not vary
from each condition (the defendant’s was always the lowest of any
witness), the results also showed that the conviction rates would vary
135
in accordance with the existence and kind of prior conviction. The
mean percentage rate for conviction under both the auto theft and
murder versions was markedly higher when the participant read of a
136
Although the study cautions about its
previous prior conviction.

127

Id. at 40.
Id.
129
Id. at 40–41.
130
Id. at 40.
131
Id.
132
The instruction given was a truncated version of an actual jury instruction used
in Massachusetts. Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, at 40 n.5.
133
Id. at 40.
134
Id. at 43 (“Indeed, the defendant’s credibility rating was dramatically and unvaryingly the lowest of any of the witnesses. . . . Mock jurors do not appear to be using evidence of prior convictions to assess the defendant’s credibility.”).
135
Id.
136
Id.
128
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137

potential value to real-world scenarios, evidence also indicates that
138
the situation is not much different in the real world.
Another study, conducted by Professor John Blume, focused on
individuals who were wrongfully convicted and later exonerated by
139
In the cases examined, ninety-one percent of this
DNA evidence.
class of factually innocent defendants that failed to testify had a prior
conviction and, “[i]n almost all instances, counsel for the wrongfully
convicted . . . indicated that avoiding impeachment was the principal
140
reason the defendant did not take the stand.”
In jurisdictions
which did not allow impeachment, all of the defendants in this class
141
Despite the fact that these defendants were all factually
testified.
innocent, the real-world fear of the probative value of their prior
convictions being overestimated by the jury was a key motivating fac142
tor in their decision to remain silent.
IV. HOW IT ALL PLAYS OUT:
WHITE, PAWN TO KING FOUR; BLACK, RESIGNS
The pressures which the adversarial trial model impose upon the
prosecution and defense lead inexorably to situations in which each
side seeks to maximize its individual outcome. If there are rational
actors on both sides, each party will select a choice that it believes will
lead to the highest possible partisan payoff, while exposing itself to
the least possible risk. When the criminal defendant examines impeachment with prior crimes evidence under Rule 609, he subjects
his decision regarding whether to testify to this risk/reward calcu143
lus.
While the prosecutor cannot control whether the defendant
takes the stand, should the defendant choose to testify, the prosecutor will decide whether to introduce evidence of the defendant’s
prior convictions for impeachment purposes. The prosecutor will al144
so examine this decision through the lens of partisan self-interest.
Thus, if a rational prosecutor who was seeking the conviction of the
defendant believed that impeaching the defendant with prior crimes
evidence would be detrimental to the prosecution’s case, the prosecutor would choose not to impeach. Under that condition, im137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id. at 46.
Blume, supra note 15, at 490–92.
Id.
Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 19.
Id.
See, e.g., KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.
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peachment would reduce the state’s likelihood of prevailing and thus
would be irrational. The defendant’s choice of whether or not to testify, and the prosecution’s choice of whether or not to impeach
should the defendant testify, creates a situation that may be reduced
145
to a game theory model. The actions of both parties are completely
146
predictable as a result of a two-player zero-sum “Minimax” game.
This partisan wrangling, however, does not take into consideration
147
the epistemic price to be paid by the trial process as a whole.
A “game,” in this context, refers to a conflict between rational
148
parties who each distrust the other. If the resolution of the conflict
must result in only one of the two players achieving a fixed-sum
149
150
goal, the “game” can be further described as “zero-sum.”
A twoplayer, zero-sum game will always result in one player’s gain and the
151
In the parlance of the game itother player’s proportionate loss.
self, the actual “points” which one gains or loses is referred to as “util152
ity.” Utility is the numerical representation of the actual, subjective
153
To illustrate this concept, suppose two
preferences of each player.
people are playing a game of chess with a wager of one dollar bet
upon the outcome. Further suppose that each player’s motivation to
play the game is simply the desire to win the dollar. In this context,
each player’s utility would be the subjective value that each player attaches to winning the game of chess. Here, this value may be fairly
characterized as the monetary amount due the winner of the game,
154
or one dollar.
In any two-player, zero-sum game, each player will
155
attempt to maximize his or her subjective utility.

145

The creation of game theory is generally attributed to John von Neumann.
The theory itself is a method of approaching interest conflict between parties or
“players.” R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 2 (1957).
146
POUNDSTONE, supra note 22, at 7.
147
See infra Part V.
148
POUNDSTONE, supra note 22, at 39.
149
Id. at 51 (“The best example is a game like poker, where players put money in
the pot, and someone wins it. . . . It is in this restricted but quite diverse category of
games that game theory has enjoyed its greatest success.”).
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 145, at 4.
154
POUNDSTONE, supra note 22, at 51 (“In a game played for money, money is utility or nearly so. When a game is played just to win, the mere fact of winning confers
utility.”).
155
See id. at 51.
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As another example, suppose a conflict situation arises in which
156
two siblings, Elizabeth and Harry, argue over a bar of candy. Their
mother approaches and mandates that Elizabeth break the bar into
two portions. However, the mother allows Harry to choose which of
the two pieces to take for his own once the bar is split. Each child defines his or her subjective utility as possession of the largest piece of
candy possible. Elizabeth would thus appear to have an incentive to
divide the bar into unequal portions. However, the fact that Harry
would have the first choice of piece limits that option; Harry would
also prefer to have a larger share, and thus would be certain to use
his choice to obtain the larger piece. To achieve her maximum
amount of individual utility, Elizabeth must break the bar into portions that are as equal as possible. The results of this game can also
be represented in tabular format:

Elizabeth’s Strategies
Make unequal pieces
Make equal pieces

Harry’s Strategies
Pick larger
Pick Smaller
Receive Smaller
Receive Larger
Piece
Piece
Receive Equal Piece
Receive Equal Piece

Elizabeth chooses first whether to break the candy bar into relatively equal or unequal portions. Harry then chooses to pick either
the larger or smaller piece. The Minimax theorem stipulates that,
when given a situation such as in this example, Elizabeth will always
choose to break the bar equally, as Harry will always pick what he believes to be the larger piece. Thus, the bottom left hand quadrant
will always be the expected outcome of this particular game. Although there was an apparent sequence in each player’s turn (Elizabeth chooses first followed by Harry), because Elizabeth can figure
157
out with certainty what Harry’s strategy would be, it is possible to
conceive of this game as having simultaneous turns.
Much as the initial brandishment of the candy bar sparked the
strategic considerations of the children in the above hypothetical, the
possibility of impeachment with prior-crimes evidence in a criminal
trial compels opposing parties to consider their strategic options.
Their analyses can likewise find expression as a two-person Minimax
game. Here, both the prosecution and the defendant are players in
this trial arena. The defendant’s tactical decision is to choose be156
157

For a similar example, see id. at 52; see also LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 145, at 71.
See POUNDSTONE, supra note 22, at 54.
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tween taking the stand and testifying or remaining silent. The prosecutor’s decision is whether to impeach the defendant’s credibility
with evidence of the defendant’s prior crimes. In this game, each
party would define its individual utility as adding information for the
fact-finder’s consideration that, in the aggregate, best serves its side of
158
the case. Only one of the parties may ultimately prevail at trial; the
159
fact-finder will either convict or acquit the defendant.
Thus, this
game also falls under the zero-sum paradigm.
The defendant first chooses whether or not to testify. If the defendant chooses to testify, the prosecution chooses whether or not to
impeach the defendant’s credibility through the introduction of
prior crimes evidence under Rule 609. The choices of both players
will result in different kinds and amounts of information presented to
the jury. Should the defendant choose to testify, his testimonial information will be admitted for the fact-finder’s consideration. This
information will include any information which comes out in crossexamination and any information learned because of impeachment.
Should the defendant choose not to testify, no new information is
added to the arena. However, the jurors are likely left wondering why
160
the “innocent” defendant chose not to testify. Much like Elizabeth
in the hypothetical example above, who understood that Harry would
seek to obtain as big a piece of candy as possible, rational criminal
defense counsel knows that the impeachment mechanism and the introduction of evidence of the defendant’s prior crimes maximizes the
161
prosecution’s utility.
Thus, the players of this impeachment game
can likewise be conceived as choosing their strategies simultaneously.
Similar to the candy-bar hypothetical, this prior crimes impeachment
game may be represented graphically:

158

See supra Part III.
Plea bargains and other settlement agreements are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
160
Although the prosecution may no longer ask the jury to draw a negative inference from the defendant’s failure to testify, the jury may nevertheless come to a similar conclusion on their own. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
161
See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 11, at 146–47.
159
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Prosecution’s Strategies
Impeach
Do Not Impeach
Testimony & prior
Testimony
conviction
information only
information
Jury presented with a Jury presented with a
silent defendant
silent defendant

The Minimax “solution” for the defense will be the choice which
offers the highest amount of utility to the defendant while granting
the least possible amount of utility to the prosecution. Empirically,
162
the solution to the game is again the bottom left quadrant because
the addition of impeachment information provides greater utility to
163
the prosecution than the introduction of the defendant’s testimony
provides to the defendant. While the defendant’s direct testimony
will expose the jury to information favorable to his side of the argument, the risk of cross-examination and impeachment with evidence
164
Therefore,
of prior crimes obviates any advantage gained thereby.
even the factually innocent criminal defendant whose prior record
includes impeachable offenses should always refrain from testifying if
at all possible.
V. CHANGING THE GAME
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence aim to achieve several
165
purposes, the current Rule 609(a) is remarkable for not satisfying
any of these goals when the defendant has a record of felony or crimen falsi convictions. While the defendant possesses a choice of
166
whether to testify, the rational outcome of that choice is silence.
This outcome reduces—does not add to—the information available
167
168
to the trier of fact. Juries, and in some cases judges, are likely to
162

Id.; see Blume, supra note 15, at 483–85.
Greater utility here means the negative inferences juries draw from the impeachment. See, e.g., Blume, supra note 15, at 487–88.
164
See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 11, at 146–47 (noting that defendants with
prior convictions chose to testify less often than defendants without a prior criminal
record); see also Blume, supra note 15, at 490–91.
165
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.”).
166
See supra Part IV.
167
See Blume, supra note 15, at 487–88.
163
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give substantial probative weight to the prior conviction evidence.
They are likely to hold prior conviction evidence admissible on the
one hand, and a valid indicator of a propensity to commit crimes on
the other. Fearing the fact-finder’s likely drawing of these inferences
from the introduction of the prior conviction information, defense
counsel’s tactical response is to prevent the information from reaching the fact-finder by keeping his client from testifying at all. Despite
the fact that our system purports to value the defendant’s testi169
mony, the actions of the opposing parties control the information
170
available to the trial court. Rule 609 works to undo the right to testify accorded to the defendant since the unsworn statement doctrine
171
was swept away in Ferguson. As the Court then stated, in justifying a
criminal defendant’s right to testify, any other outcome would result
172
in “the right to be heard by counsel [to be] of little worth.”
Thus,
the availability of prior crimes impeachment under Rule 609 does not
result in the optimum epistemic outcome when applied to a criminal
173
Jury instructions cannot
defendant’s choice of whether to testify.
wash away the harm the defendant incurs by testifying and being sub174
ject to the impeachment.
Worse, the roots of this harm rest in the
jury’s likely adoption of inferences that the law expressly seeks to pre175
vent, such as an inference that the defendant possesses a propensity
to commit crime. As an accused should not be convicted simply because of prior bad acts, reform of Rule 609 is urgently needed. Specifically, the Rule should be changed to disallow the use of prior conviction evidence for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
testifying party.
Whether in cases of prior felony or crimen falsi, prior conviction
evidence should not be admissible for credibility impeachment.
Some states have taken the lead in recognizing the disproportionate
impact that their state versions of Rule 609 had upon the defendant’s
176
Montana has excluded prior conviction evidence
right to testify.
168

See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 271 A.2d 641, 644 (Md. 1970).
See supra Part II.
170
See supra Part III.
171
See generally Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961) (establishing the defendant’s right to testify—as opposed to an unsworn statement—as a constitutional right
that the states must provide).
172
Id. at 595 (citing Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954)).
173
See, e.g., Blume, supra note 15, at 490–91.
174
See, e.g., Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, at 38.
175
See FED. R. EVID. 404.
176
See HAW. REV. STAT § 626-1, RULE 609 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (2008);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-609 (2008). But see Surrat, supra note 67, at 914 (noting
169
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177

from its state version of Rule 609.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii
has likewise found that impeachment with prior felony convictions
178
The
violates the due process clause of the Hawaii Constitution.
Kansas version of Rule 609 follows the Hawaiian model, denying the
use of prior felony conviction evidence for a felony, but allowing its
179
use in crimen falsi cases. Thus, the Rule 609 game faced by the two
adversaries in these states differs greatly from the impeachment game
of Federal Rule 609.
Indeed, evidentiary rules which exclude evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes allow the parties
to play a much different game than what Federal Rule 609 currently
180
allows.
A rebalancing of the risks and rewards of testifying by excluding prior conviction evidence for the impeachment of criminal
defendants would provide an increased incentive for criminal defendants to testify during their criminal trial. Modifying Federal Rule
181
609 to comport with the Montana model would result in a completely different Minimax game:

that the movement of these states toward these positions has not resulted in the creation of an overall trend to do so in other jurisdictions).
177
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-609 (stating that “[f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a
crime is not admissible”).
178
State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 661 (Haw. 1971) (“[T]o convict a criminal defendant where prior crimes have been introduced to impeach his credibility as a witness violates the accused’s constitutional right to testify in his own defense.”); see also
Asato v. Furtado, 474 P.2d 288, 294–95 (Haw. 1970).
We think that there are a great many criminal offenses the conviction
of which has no bearing whatsoever upon the witness’ propensity for lying or truth-telling, and that such convictions ought not to be admitted
for purposes of impeachment. . . . This is true not only of minor offenses like parking tickets or . . . running red lights, but also of some
major offenses like murder or assault and battery. It is hard to see any
rational connection between, say, a crime of violence and the likelihood that the witness will tell the truth.
Id. at 294–95. Note, however, that impeachment for prior convictions for crimen falsi is still acceptable in Hawaii. HAW. REV. STAT § 626-1.
179
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421.
180
See supra Part IV.
181
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-609.
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Under this game model, the criminal defendant need not consider the effect of his prior convictions when deciding whether to testify. Restricting the prosecutor from impeaching the defendant with
prior conviction evidence refocuses the choices of both parties. The
defense would first make a determination of whether the defendant’s
recounting of his story provides greater benefit, in light of a prosecution’s cross-examination, than remaining silent. The choice that best
maximizes the prosecutor’s utility is to cross-examine the defendant,
even without prior crimes impeachment. If the defense concludes
that the defendant’s case would benefit from testimony and crossexamination, this game’s solution is the upper-left quadrant. The
prosecutor—restricted by a reformed Rule 609—would instead focus
solely upon cross-examination of the defendant’s testimony at trial.
Rebalancing this decision provides several epistemic benefits to
the trial process. First, stimulating the criminal defendant to testify
with this proposed change would, on balance, bring more relevant
182
information under the examination lens of the fact-finder.
This
added information would come from the defendant, a witness acknowledged to be in the possession of information with special sig183
Under the current Rule 609, defennificance to the proceeding.
dants may refuse to testify merely due to fears of prior conviction
184
impeachment.
In the case of factually innocent defendants, this
justified fear only serves to hinder the truth-seeking function of the
trial process. A survey of factually innocent defendants, who have lat185
er been exonerated through the introduction of DNA evidence,
indicates that they would have testified at their trial were it not for

182

See Blume, supra note 15, at 496–97.
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987).
184
See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (quoting People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753, 762–63 (Cal. 1965)); Blume, supra note 15, at 490–91.
185
Blume, supra note 15, at 491–92.
183
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fear of impeachment with their prior crimes.
Having these defendants recount their version of the events at issue in their respective
criminal trials could have increased the likelihood of an epistemologically correct “not-guilty” trial verdict. Moreover, the eventual exoneration of these factually innocent criminal defendants indicates
that any probative value the fact-finder may have ascribed to their
prior convictions would have been illusory. As the Supreme Court
explicitly illuminated forty-seven years ago, the criminal defendant
has a constitutional right to tell his story to the jury through the aid
187
Reforming Rule 609 to exclude prior conviction
of his counsel.
impeachment would bolster this right to testify by allowing a broad
class of defendants to consider only the risk of cross-examination
when deciding whether or not to testify.
Second, a prior conviction that meets the Rule 609 requirements
for impeachment purposes is not necessarily probative for the pur188
poses of evaluating the defendant’s credibility. It is possible that an
individual’s commission of certain offenses could work to enhance—
not reduce—his credibility under oath. For example, consider the
situation of an individual placed on trial for resisting conscription into the armed forces. In this example, the defendant morally objects
to compulsory service in the military. Rather than fleeing to a safe
haven, he turns himself in, choosing instead to be tried and convicted
for the offense of resisting the draft. If he is arrested several years
later and charged with a different crime, impeachment of his credibility based upon that prior conviction would be illogical—the defendant was so committed to telling the truth of his beliefs that he
was willing to accept punishment for them. Yet, under the current
Rule 609, evidence of his prior conviction could nevertheless be used
189
to taint his credibility in the eyes of the fact-finder. Reforming Rule
186

Id.
See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 595 (1961).
188
Blume, supra note 15, at 494–95. The study performed by Wissler and Saks also
indicates that the probative value of prior convictions on the defendant’s credibility
is low in general. Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, at 42.
189
Jeremy Bentham gave another example of this phenomenon. 2 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 519 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) (1940) (citing 7 JEREMY BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 406 (Bowring ed. 1827)).
Take homicide in the way of duelling [sic]. Two men quarrel; one of
them calls the other a liar. So highly does he prize the reputation of
veracity, that, rather than suffer a stain to remain upon it, he determines to risk his life, challenges his adversary to fight, and kills him.
Jurisprudence, in its sapience, knowing no difference between homicide by consent, by which no other human being is put in fear—and
homicide in pursuit of a scheme of highway robbery, of nocturnal
housebreaking, by which every man who has a life is put in fear of it,—
187
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609 to forbid the use of prior conviction impeachment would avoid
this epistemic pitfall.
Third, it is difficult to analytically separate any probative value of
a defendant’s prior conviction related to his credibility on the stand
from a forbidden propensity inference. The likelihood that the factfinder properly considers prior crimes impeachment evidence and
applies it only toward evaluation of the defendant’s testimonial cre190
The criminal defendant’s credibility is already the
dibility is low.
lowest of any witness, due to the fact that he is a criminal defendant
191
in the first place. Thus, although presumptively innocent, his status
as a person charged with a crime likely taints the fact-finder’s initial
192
approach to evaluating his testimony.
When fact-finders become
aware of a defendant’s prior record, they may use the information for
an inappropriate purpose, either because of a belief that the information is probative as to guilt or through a lowering of the standard of
proof. For example, jurors who believe that the defendant is a “bad”
person due to prior criminal behavior may be more easily convinced
as to the defendant’s guilt, or feel less of a need to carefully evaluate
193
the case. Moreover, when the defendant’s prior convictions are for
crimes similar to the offense for which he is currently on trial, the
chance that the fact-finder will make these types of forbidden pro194
In the case of prior convictions
pensity inferences is even higher.
of crimen falsi, such as perjury, it is practically impossible to separate
the proper impeachment use of prior crimen falsi conviction evidence from an improper propensity usage. For example, a factfinder could be expected to evaluate the testimonial credibility of a
defendant with a prior conviction for perjury. The proper consideration of this prior conviction according to Rule 609 requires the fact-

has made the one and the other murder, and consequently felony.
The man prefers death to the imputation of a lie,—and the inference
of the law is, that he cannot open his mouth but lies will issue from it.
Id.
190

See DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 32.
See Hornstein, supra note 13, at 15 (noting that “with respect to the credibility
question, there is already substantial doubt about the defendant’s veracity arising
from his or her interest in the outcome”).
192
Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, at 41, 43.
193
Id. at 44–45.
194
See, e.g., United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414, 418–19 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating
that “[a]dmission of evidence of a similar offense often does little to impeach the
credibility of a testifying defendant while undoubtedly prejudicing him”); Wissler &
Saks, supra note 7, at 41–42 (“[D]efendants previously convicted of the same crime
had a significantly higher conviction rate than defendants previously convicted of
perjury or a dissimilar crime . . . .”).
191
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finder to take into account that the prior conviction could affect the
defendant’s testimony without making the forbidden inference that
the defendant possesses a propensity to lie under oath. Such atomis195
tic mental gymnastics do not likely take place in the minds of fact196
finders.
VI. CONCLUSION
As long as prior-crimes impeachment under Rule 609 is in place,
criminal prosecutors operate under a system that allows them to decide both how to break the candy bar in two and which piece to
197
take. The best method of rebalancing the risk and reward ratio between the defendant’s testimony and silence is to remove from consideration the impediment that impeachment becomes and to modify
Rule 609 accordingly. Reforming Rule 609 in this manner would
bring several epistemic benefits to the criminal trial process. As players in the trial arena, each adversary currently understands that if
prior crimes impeachment is available, the rational strategy for each
party results in the withholding of particularly relevant information
from the fact-finder’s consideration: the defendant’s story itself. Removing prior crimes impeachment would stimulate defendants to testify—particularly factually innocent defendants—while working to
eliminate the possibility that the fact-finder misuses propensity inferences.

195

See supra Part III.
DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 32.
197
Or, as Shakespeare’s Hermione said,
Since what I am to say must be but that
Which contradicts my accusation, and
The testimony on my part no other
But what comes from myself, it shall scare boot me
To say ‘not guilty:’mine integrity,
Being counted falsehood, shall, as I express it,
Be so received.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE WINTER’S TALE act 3, sc. 2.
196

